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I. INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis will likely have a long-lasting impact on Italy's economic potential. Indeed, innovation and investment opportunities may weaken because demand prospects are likely to be poor and the real cost of borrowing remains high. In addition, some of the increase in unemployment may be structural given that displaced workers will find it hard to return to the labor market as industrial restructuring takes hold.
Against this backdrop, this paper assesses Italy's medium-term output losses following the crisis and their implications for the longer-term growth outlook and the fiscal situation. It argues that Italy's deep-rooted structural problems-giving rise to unsatisfactory productivity growth-had weakened the Italian economy long before the financial crisis. Using a variety of techniques, results suggest that output is not expected to rebound to its precrisis trend over the medium term. Unless policy actions are taken, structural weaknesses will continue to weigh on the Italian economy even when the recovery takes place.
II. PRODUCTIVITY: ITALY'S ACHILLES' HEEL
Italy has suffered from chronically low economic growth, even before the global financial crisis. Real GDP growth averaged 1.6 percent during the period 1995-2007, down from over 2 percent in the earlier decade (Figure 1 ). 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 Contributions to Growth: Historical Developments (Annual percentage changes in real GDP)
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Before the crisis, the Italian economy underperformed most of its euro area peers. Over the last decade, Italy's GDP moved gradually away from the EU15 benchmark, with average annual growth almost one percentage point lower than the average Correspondingly, Italy's per capita income (measured in purchasing power parity) has declined, diverging away from the euro area over the same period.
Italy's dismal growth performance is largely due to poor productivity. Breaking down GDP growth into labor, capital, and total factor productivity (TFP) contributions shows that the Italian economy's anemic growth is mostly explained by the declining TFP. In fact, TFP contributions decreased substantially over the period 1995-2005-a slowdown which was pervasive across all sectors but especially pronounced in manufacturing and non-tradable sectors. Besides, the reallocation of employment from sectors with higher productivity (typically manufacturing) to sectors with lower productivity (typically services) would not be large enough to justify a sizeable impact on the whole economy. By contrast, the contribution of labor growth has been positive over recent years. While contribution of capital remained broadly stable, contribution of hours worked increased significantly-also relatively to the EU15-thanks to extensive labor market reforms. Within the labor factor, labor participation accounted for almost half of the annual GDP growth in [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . The contribution of employment was also substantial, while that of average hours worked was marginally negative. In addition, there was a strong contribution from immigration.
The contrasting movements of labor and total factor productivity may be partly an (unwanted) effect of sweeping labor market reforms. A significant trade-off between employment and productivity can be observed since 1997. As firms responded to labor market reforms by shifting to less capital-intensive production methods, a somewhat reduced rate of capital deepening had to be expected. Moreover, regularization of the illegal immigrant work force may have contributed to bringing to light irregular employment, which had not previously been included in estimates, thereby depressing measured productivity growth. This could have been the case in Italy, following the changes in labor market legislation in favor of more flexibility. Nevertheless, it is striking that the drop in the TFP growth since the mid-1990s has largely offset the increase in labor supply following the reforms.
Protracted sluggishness in productivity growth may also conceal economic features, including:

Relatively high tax ratios, deemed to have undercut Italy's growth performance by discouraging labor supply and investment;  A heavy regulatory burden in labor and product markets and bureaucratic red tape, likely to have hampered competition and stifled incentives to invest;
 A large share of small and medium-size enterprises, which might have hobbled productivity growth by limiting the scope for economies of scale and technology transfers.
Indeed, the presence of such rigidities-along with an industrial specialization in products with relatively low value added-may also have contributed to Italy's steady erosion of competitiveness, as highlighted by the significant decline in Italy's world market share in world trade since the mid-1990s (even compared to its peers).
III. THE CRISIS: A NEW TOLL ON PRODUCTIVITY
The global financial crisis took a toll on Italy's economy. The downturn in Italy started earlier and has been deeper and longer-lasting than in most of its euro area peers. Output contracted by 1.3 percent in 2008 and 5.0 percent in 2009. The recession in Italy's main trading partners led to a sharp fall in exports. Investment dropped more sharply than in earlier recessions reflecting weak demand prospects, while inventories were cut. Despite strong household balance sheets, private consumption also declined significantly, possibly reflecting uncertainty, rising unemployment, and tighter consumer credit, and was only marginally offset by the modest rise in government consumption.
The economy suffered the worst recession since World War II. The collapse in economic activity was far more severe than the one experienced during the 1974-75 oil-price crisis and the 1992-93 EMS crisis (Figure 2 ). In the first quarter of 2009, growth witnessed a decline in growth of 6 percent (year-on-year), four times as large as the one experienced during the EMS crisis. Additionally, growth was starting from weaker initial conditions. More importantly, following the EMS crisis, output did not recover to its precrisis trend , resulting in permanent loss in potential output growth in the long run. 4 The most distinguishing feature of this recession was the sharp deterioration of exports (Italy's traditional engine of growth). The globally synchronized nature of this recession led to the largest historical contraction of Italian exports since the 1930s. As a result, investment dropped sharper than experienced in earlier recessions. On the other hand, the profile of decline in private consumption was similar, though more persistent.
Since the onset of the crisis, productivity has plummeted even further, exacerbating Italy's long-standing structural weaknesses ( Table 1) . As a result, unit labor costs have soared and profitability has been further squeezed, worsening Italy's already weak competitive position. On the other hand, capital deepening has-thus far-been showing 3 See Bassanetti, et al. (2009) for a comparison of historical recessions in Italy. 4 Data is not available to examine the recovery to pre-crisis trend for other historical recessions.
Source: Eurostat. [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] strong resilience, while unemployment has been rising only modestly, largely due to part-time work schemes and declining hours worked. Regrettably, the drop in TFP growth over 2008-09 has been so large it has offset most of the resilience in capital and-to a lesser extent-employment. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO DISENTANGLE TEMPORARY FROM PERMANENT LOSSES
It is very difficult to assess how much of the observed decline in output is associated with a persistent (but temporary) demand shock versus supply factors. A sudden collapse in activity could be the result of a severe and long-lasting demand shock or the outcome of a structural change in the economy, such as an increase in natural rate of unemployment or a sectoral reallocation of production factors. While the latter would translate into a permanent loss in potential output, the former would translate into a temporary increase in the size of the output gap.
The crisis has induced an unprecedented fall in output, which is likely to have broken down previous economic relationships. While in normal times business cycle fluctuations account for most of the output volatility; in times of crisis, structural changes may occur, contributing substantially (and more than usual) to output movements.
Survey measures of capacity utilization and expected capacity constraints indicate that the adverse demand shocks started in late 2008.
There is evidence that financial conditions had tightened before the collapse in capacity utilization at the onset of the crisis. However, during 2009, demand collapsed and this limited production ( Figure 3 ).
Several approaches have been used in this paper to assess the impact of the crisis on potential output performance. None of them is deemed to be perfect or superior, but each offers some insight into this difficult issue: Statistical approaches. They offer the advantage of using information from the past, while being internally consistent, but the results may not be robust in periods of large structural changes. Among these we consider: 5 a) the univariate Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, b) and two multivariate unobserved component models:
i. a multivariate filter (MV), and
ii. a production function approach (PFA).
Historical approach. Evidence from previous international crises is also considered. Unlike some statistical methodologies, this approach does not impose any priori restrictions on the analysis and can therefore offer an alternative more judgmental perspective.
Univariate two-sided filter
Despite its simplicity, the HP filter has a number of shortcomings. The HP filter only uses the data for the series itself, hence ignoring other relevant economic information. It extracts the trend component, balancing a good fit of actual series with the smoothness of the trend. In addition, the results are not model-based and are prone to "end-point bias," which becomes a significant problem considering the substantial revisions of recent estimates (Appendix I). Generally, the approach is useful for historical analysis but not well-suited for forward looking analysis.
Estimates of potential output and potential labor productivity based on a two-sided moving average smoothing procedure (the HP filter) point to a pre-existing weakness in labor productivity trend growth (Figure 4 ). However, because of the "end-point" problem intrinsic to the two-sided moving average smoothing procedure, trend measures based on HP-filtering procedure generally prove unreliable, especially if a prolonged recession or a structural break occurs at the end of the sample, as it was indeed the case with the outbreak of the crisis.
A multivariate (MV) filter

A key advantage of the Multivariate (MV) filter is that it incorporates both recent data and long-term trends (Appendix II).
The approach uses a small macroeconomic model to estimate the empirical relationships between actual and potential GDP, unemployment, core inflation, and capacity utilization in manufacturing. Note that this approach assumes that the relationships between the major economic variables were stable despite the large shocks associated 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 with the crisis. In this sense, the approach provides the counterfactual of what would be the dynamics if this were a "normal" recession (i.e. a recession for which only the size of the shock was large but without any structural break). Proj.
The
Economic Activity Gaps
The recoveries in output and utilization gaps are expected to move in tandem, while the unemployment gap lags behind. The above figure portrays the dynamics of the estimated gaps for output, unemployment rate, and capacity utilization. The unemployment gap is influenced by the current and lagged output gap but has smaller cyclical fluctuations. The smooth profile of the unemployment gap is associated with labor hoarding and the "discouraged worker" effect during recessions. The utilization gap exhibits more volatility with sharp declines during recessions. In particular, the utilization gap declined to in 1993 and to over 8 percent in 2009. Following the 2009 trough, the capacity utilization and the output gaps rebound, closing by 2012. In contrast, the recovery of the unemployment gap lags behind, closing by 2014.
There is a high degree of uncertainty around the forecast. While the multivariate filter projects the output gap to close by 2012, there is a high degree of uncertainty around this forecast with confidence bands widening to about 4 percentage points (-2 to +2 percent). Figure 5 illustrates the estimated year-on-year potential output growth, and the historical and projected real GDP growth. While the estimated growth of potential is correlated with actual growth, the path of potential growth is rather smooth. As expected, fluctuations in output are found to be mainly driven by demand shocks in the short-term and by movements in potential output in the long-term.
A Production Function Approach
A production function approach (PFA) with unobserved stochastic components offers another perspective on potential output (Appendix III). The rationale for this approach is to estimate potential output from the trend levels of its structural determinants, such as productivity and factor inputs. 6 Using a production function, such trend levels are extracted by taking into account the relationships between the cyclical components of output and unemployment, the link between cyclical productivity and cyclical hours worked, as well as the impact of the business cycle on labor supply dynamics. Estimates are carried out using real-time data and a Bayesian framework. In order to use sufficiently long quarterly frequency time series, a PFA must usually rely on low-quality data on capital stocks and hours worked, raising issues on whether the TFP component will be spuriously contaminated by measurement problems. Estimates from PFA show that the major source of potential growth variation is associated with changes in labor participation. The bulk of the permanent variation in output is found to be driven by shifts in labor trends, namely labor participation and employment. Conversely, cyclical variations in real GDP are mainly driven by (total factor) productivity fluctuations.
While TFP is found to be highly pro-cyclical, the dynamics of its structural component markedly diverge from those of potential output. Since the mid-1990s, TFP growth has declined from one percent to zero. On the contrary, potential growth has risen from an annual rate of 0.7 percent at the end of 1992-93 recession to over 2 percent just before the current slowdown-a growth rate analogous to that of the early 1990s. Finally, there seems to be a constant wedge between the trend growth in labor and factor productivity, confirming the idea that the rate of capital deepening has remained stable over time, at around 1 percent.
TFP and hours worked are strongly pro-cyclical. Both have dramatically plunged below trend since 2002 and have become more pro-cyclical since 1999. The unemployment rate is found to be significantly countercyclical and-consistently with previous model estimatesto fall by about 0.04 percent as output rises 1 percent above potential. Interestingly, labor participation is found to be broadly acyclical, whereas there is evidence of positive comovements between average hours worked per employee, output, and productivity, once structural shifts in factor trends have been identified. Implied output gap estimates tend to exhibit higher volatility than corresponding estimates from the MV approach. The NAIRU is estimated to rise gradually, from 7.2 in 2009 to 7.9 percent by 2014, when the unemployment gap is also expected to be reabsorbed (Table 2) .
Evidence from previous international episodes
Output performance in the aftermath of past financial crises can offer useful insights into the medium-term recovery prospects. IMF (2009) studied the medium-term output dynamics after financial crises over the past four decades across a wide range of countries. This examined the impact of initial conditions on post-crisis medium-term output losses. The initial conditions considered include those for output, investment, macroeconomic imbalances, level of income and financial development, openness, external conditions, and whether the financial crisis is accompanied by a currency crisis. Estimated OLS coefficients in IMF (2009) are here applied to calculate the impact of the global financial crisis on Italy's medium term output level (Table 3) .
Based on this approach, the medium-term output is estimated to decline by about 15 percent relative to the precrisis trend but some caveats should be noted. The mediumterm output is estimated to decline by about 15 percent relative to the precrisis trend, well above the 10 percent average found for historical international financial crisis episodes in IMF (2009). The result was driven by a high precrisis investment share of GDP, which was found to be highly correlated with negative capital dynamics following historical international financial crises. Indeed, evidence shows that countries with high precrisis investment to GDP ratios during the three years preceding the crisis experienced large output losses. Another key contributing factor is Italy's large initial output loss during the crisisthe variable most associated with medium-term output performance-confirming the view that the permanent toll of the crisis on economic activity has been exacerbated by Italy's deep-rooted structural weaknesses. This finding suggests that postcrisis macroeconomic policies could play a role in shaping medium-term dynamics-an issue worth examining here. Average gross fixed capital formation to GDP ratio during the three pre-crisis years.
Deviation from historical average (based on the seven-year period ending three years before the crisis) of the investment to GDP ratio during the three preAverage current account to GDP ratio during the three years before the crisis.
Deviation from historical average (based on the seven-year period ending three years before the crisis) of current account to GDP during the three pre-crisis Average inflation during the three years before the crisis.
Deviation from historical average (based on the seven-year period ending three years before the crisis) of inflation during the three pre-crisis years.
Average gerneral government overal fiscal balance to GDP ratio during the three years before the crisis.
Deviation from historical average (based on the seven-year period ending three years before the crisis) of overall fiscal balance during the three pre-crisis
Average of the logarithm of output per capita of GDP per capita at purchasing power parity during the three years before the crisis.
Variable definition
Deviation from historical average (based on the seven-year period ending three years before the crisis) of output during the three pre-crisis years.
Deviation from historical average (based on the seven-year period ending three years before the crisis) of output during the crisis year.
Note: The table reports contributions of respective variables for Italy based on estimated coefficient of ordinary least squares reported in IMF(2009). All the variables, except for the currency crisis and first-year output change, are calculated as average for the three years before the crisis Deviation from historical average (based on the seven-year period ending three years before the crisis) of credit to GDP ratio during the three pre-crisis years.
Dummy=1 if the financial crisis coincides with a curreny crisis, and zero otherwise.
Three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate obtained from Thomson Datastream.
A dummy variable that equals one if partner-countries' growth is in the worst 10 percent over the last 40 years, and zero otherwise.
The sum of foreign assets and foreign liabilities divided by GDP, using the External Wealth of Nations Mark II Database (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti,
The sum of exports and imports divided by GDP. 1998 -2004 . Three quarters of these losses are estimated to be related to shortfalls in potential output. The path of output level is not expected to rebound to its precrisis trend over the medium term, even though growth is projected to do so within the next two years. In the short-run, the decline in output growth is mainly accounted for by a collapse in productivity growth. Over the medium term, productivity is likely to recover and contribute to potential output growth by approximately 0.5 percent, while employment is deemed to suffer more enduring losses. Similarly, capital accumulation is expected to remain weak over 2010 and, in the medium term, to contribute to growth slightly less than used to. The estimated output loss by 2015 relative to precrisis trend (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) ranges between 11 to 15 percent using different methodologies.
Stronger fiscal adjustment will be required. The profile of potential output and the output gap projected by the MV filter and the PFA implies that the fiscal structural deficits are underestimated. Looking forward, there will be a need for a stronger adjustment effort than the current projections entail, and for reforms to stimulate faster growth. With the forecasted real GDP growth, the consolidation envisaged in the authorities' latest Stability Program would still not be sufficient to ensure a sustained reduction in public debt. With lower real GDP growth over the medium-term, than currently projected, a stronger, expenditure-based, adjustment effort would be needed to put debt on a declining path. A more front-loaded fiscal adjustment would also help balance, to some extent, the highly unequal intergenerational distribution of the long-term fiscal adjustment arising particularly from the current design of the pension reform.
V. POLICY: LIMITING THE DAMAGE
Downside risks for a permanent loss in potential output growth in the long run remain, especially if the global recovery stalls and financial conditions worsen, adversely impacting investments and total factor productivity growth. As highlighted by evidence from previous crisis episodes, downside risks to the output growth recovery reflect a sharper than expected fall in TFP and capital accumulation during the recession as well as a declining labor participation rate, mainly due to lack of incentives for industrial restructuring.
Policy can also limit the damage. Macroeconomic policies can shape medium-term dynamics by reducing the permanent costs associated to the crisis. In Italy, for example, the wage supplementation fund (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni) does involve on-the-job training which could cushion the impact of the crisis on structural unemployment.
But which policy priorities? Applying the Lisbon Assessment Framework (LAF) may help identify policy priorities and areas that could help strengthen medium-term TFP growth, (Table 4) . TFP growth is shown to be affected by a number of policies, notably in the areas of R&D and innovation, education, product and capital market regulation, as well as a number of labor market policies aiming at increasing working time and making work pay. Despite the above-mentioned progresses, however, the impact on Italy's productivity and economic growth has been limited. This may suggest divergent conclusions: either the effects of the implemented reforms are yet to be felt in Italy, or a lot more is needed for reforms to produce visible results or-and this is also a possibility-reforms are not as growth-inducing as the literature seems to suggest.
If growth cannot be resumed through structural reforms, sizeable fiscal adjustment will be required. With lower real GDP growth over the medium-term than currently projected, a stronger, expenditure-based, adjustment effort would be needed to put debt on a declining path. This calls for a more ambitious fiscal consolidation starting now. The unemployment dynamics reflect labor market characteristics. Equation (5) identifies the unemployment gap dynamics by the output gap and the lagged unemployment gap. Okun's law suggests a relationship between unemployment and output movements. The lagged unemployment gap is included to reflect the lag between developments in output and unemployment in line with theory and data. Similarly, equation (6) implies a relationship between capacity utilization gap, its lag, and output gap. The evolution of equilibrium unemployment rate, NAIRU, is determined in equation (7). The equilibrium unemployment U is influenced by its lag, transitory shocks ( , persistent shocks (G U , the output gap, and difference between current equilibrium unemployment and its steady state level in the long-run U . The specification would take into consideration the persistence in unemployment. The persistent shocks follow an autoregressive process illustrated in equation (8).
The potential output depends on changes in NAIRU and the underlying potential growth trend. In equation (9), the coefficient for first difference of the NAIRU is set to equal the labor share in a Cobb-Douglas production function (θ . The coefficient of the long-run difference (19 quarters) of NAIRU is constrained to (1-) so that in the log-run the impact of a permanent changes in NAIRU are fully reflected in the potential output level. The underlying potential growth trend ( follows serially correlated deviations from the steady-state growth rate. The equilibrium capacity utilization C also follows a stochastic process with transitory (ε C and persistent (G C shocks. Equation (13) formulates the perceived long-term inflation objective, taking into consideration revisions to previous period expectations captured by ( ). The historical data for the long-term inflation expectations is obtained from Consensus Economics. In equation (14), the output gap is influenced by monetary policy, while other factors encompassed by the stochastic term .
The model is estimated using Bayesian technique. The sample period is 1992Q4 to 2009Q3. We assume a steady-state value of 0.61 for the labor share, 0.7 percent for output growth, and 8.3 percent for the unemployment rate. 
